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THE ENGLISH AND AmERICAN BACKGROUND
History, old style, had a comfortable way of being factual. It
recorded the death of Victoria, good Queen and Empress, on a
dreary day in 1901 and made due note of the accession of her son,
Edward, as King Emperor, in its usual accurate manner. It declared
precisely that the Victorian era had come to a definite end, at a pre-
cise moment, just at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Looking back now over the first fifty years of the twentieth
century, however, the social commentator, new style, would have a
good deal of difficulty in pinpointing the time when Victoria "died".
Some might say that the good Queen had not ceased breathing until
the advent of the First World War or until its close. Others might
say that the years of frenzy and inflationary activity which suc-
ceeded the First World War and which terminated so disastrously
in 1929 marked the twilight of her life. Others, looking for a per-
sonal villain, might venture the initials of F.D.R. as those of the
regicide.
Whatever the date of Victoria's death, whatever the length of
her long reign, there are many who hold to the nostalgic thought
that her period of power was truly a Golden Age; "golden" es-
pecially with respect to the ownership and management of prop-
erty. "Golden" because the economy of the civilized world was di-
rectly keyed to troy ounce of gold as a standard of monetary value.
"Golden" because the great and expanding forces of private busi-
ness were operating without substantial interference by govern-
ment. "Golden" because it was comparatively easy, in those days,
to amass a comfortable portfolio of lifetime savings and compara-
tively simple and "routine" to manage the portfolio once it has been
acquired. Like all nostalgic notions of the sort, there is much to be
distrusted in any such summation. The trustee-minded person,
however, remembers very well the sort of placid connotations to
which I refer.
To be sure, a hundred or more years before the time of Vic-
toria's death trusteeship had passed, somewhat nervously, from the
concept of safe conduct of a specific res into the concept of main-
tenance of a stated set of values. During that transition the duty of
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the English trustee had transformed itself from the relatively re-
stricted obligations related to care, custody and operation of fam-
ily agricultural real estate and its appurtenances to the much more
intricate task of trading in commercial and financial markets and
to the attempted maintenance, through the life of the trust, of a
value which had been stated to exist at the time of the opening in-
ventory. This ante-Victorian development had, to be sure, amounted
to a revolution in trust thinking. But that ferment had largely sub-
sided as the effects of the industrial revolution were consolidated
and absorbed. The successful business man in England and in
America in the second half of the nineteenth century had settled
down in his thinking about management of his family property. He
built his private fortune by taking considerable risks, to be sure,
but he entertained a different sort of notion about what should
happen to that fortune after he was gone.
Fiduciary practices in England were especially staid and con-
servative after 1850. It was the attitude of the British government
and body of law, particularly after the scandals of the regimes of
the last years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nine-
teenth centuries, that beneficiaries must be protected from any haz-
ards or risks like those which had surrounded the infamous South
Sea bubble. It was the purpose of government, moreover, to main-
tain a constant market for the royal obligations. Fiduciaries were
generally limited in the exercise of their art to acquisition of British
consols or other government obligations and certain other types of
investments which were considered proper for persons whose sole
duty, or at least whose most emphatic duty, was the conservation of
principal. The heavy balance of the trustee's art was considered to
lie, especially in England, toward the protection of generations
which would appear only in the distant future. Text writers and
observers of the fiduciary art were wont to express the trustee's
duties in terms of emphasis upon preservation of principal The
cases reveal a ready sacrifice of the interests of the income tenant
wherever a question of safety of principal arose.
This picture of the conservative fiduciary art of the late nine-
teenth century in England is, of course, a portrait of a full and ripe
civilization. With government regulation at a minimum and taxa-
tion barely reaching these accumulations of private capital, there
was little apprehension, and no actual consideration or thought,
about a possible decline in the purchasing power of the British
pound. The trustee's duty, in full discharge, required a compara-
tively small amount of imagination. There were, to be sure, many
private securities which would have been available to the trustee
of England if he had been allowed at the law to acquire them. The
economy was still' expanding. But imagination was not permitted
to the trustee. He was to act as a conservator and not as a manager.
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This same sort of placid conservatism marked the fiduciary
developments in much of the United States during the maturing
years of the nineteenth century. There was a background, to be
sure, in the Colonies and in the young Nation, and particularly in
New England, of enterprising and imaginative administration of
trust funds. This background may be placed in history as dating,
roughly, from the closing years of the eighteenth century until the
middle of the nineteenth. During that period fiduciary funds were
placed hard at work in the establishment of new mills and indus-
trial enterprises of all sorts, in the conduct of the clipper trade with
the Orient and with the West Indies, and in sundry other semi-
speculative enterprises which had long characterized the develop-
ments of the New England and Middle Atlantic State Colonies.
That employment of fiduciary funds was based upon necessity.
There was a new nation to develop. There was a shortage of the
type of "safe" fiduciary investment participation which was con-
stantly available in England.
It was a background of that nature which found expression in
the now famous case of Harvard College v. Amory, decided in the
March term of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the
year 1830.1 Any person who is interested in the development of
fiduciary property management in the United States ought to take
time to study that celebrated decision. As with all other great cases
in the history of the law the interesting aspect of the case is not so
much the language of the court but the state of facts, and the
reasoning which was advanced by counsel on both sides and by the
court in coming to its conclusion. It is a pity, these days, that we
do not ordinarily have in the reports of our cases the abstracted
briefs of the opposing counsel; it is a distinct loss, also, that modem
courts do not refer more often to the clash of opposing arguments
and state more fully their estimates of the respective values of those
arguments. Study of the extended discussion of facts and argu-
ments in Harvard College v. Amory will reveal the clash and inter-
play of the English economy against the economy of the American
Colonies and will demonstrate the fact that leading New England
lawyers and judges of that day were accomplished business men
on their own. The remarks set forth in the opinion concerning the
defects of exclusive purchase, or of any purchase, of government
bonds are not impertinent even in the modern scene! And the sum-
mation of the opinion, as to the position in which a bank finds itself
when it is confronted with a default on the part of its borrower, is
penetrating in the extreme. That tribunal was too well versed in the
commercial arts to believe that any distinction in kind could be
drawn between shares in a bank and shares in manufacturing enter-
1 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446 (1830).
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prise. The bank, as they well knew, was entirely too likely to be-
come a manufacturer, noilens volens, when the loan had to be en-
forced! The entirely shrewd conclusion of the court boiled down to
one statement. "Do what you will the capital is at hazard." There
were, in short, no "safe" investments. This concept reflected the
fact, of course, that during the hundred years preceding 1830, all
property management in America had been necessarily specula-
tive. The rejection of a category of so-called "safe investments" was
a typically American mental approach. It possessed the added psy-
chological comfort, of course, of rejection of one more British tra-
dition. Out of it came the final distillation of Yankee investment
management thinking now so often appearing in print as a classic
statement of the prudent man rule.
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise sound discre-
tion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as
the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
The court in Harvard College v. Amory, moreover, was keenly
aware of an added factor, especially important in the light of the
amount of discretion which its investment rule reposed in the trus-
tee. That factor was the possible personal liability of the trustee
for mistakes in judgment. In the final paragraph of the decision
appeared this language:
Trustees are justly and uniformly considered favorably,
and it is of great importance to bereaved families and or-
phans, that they should not be held to make good, losses
in the depreciation of stocks or the failure of the capital it-
self, which they held in trust, provided they conduct them-
selves honestly and discreetly and carefully, according to
the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their trusts.
If this were held otherwise, no prudent man would run the
hazard of losses which might happen without any neglect
or breach of good faith.
Thus the leading court of that day in the New England States,
and possibly the leading court of that day in the United States, in
one clear announcement freed the Massachusetts fiduciary from
the ancient English shackles and pointed the way toward a use of
the accumulated savings of previous generations which could be
imaginative, daring, fruitful in the public and private sense and,
yet, free of unwarranted personal risks on the part of the trustee.
That salutary rule was, of course, the chief reason for the later
flowering of what has come to be known as Boston trusteeship.
But, as is so often the case in the development of the law, the
statement of the rule laid down in Harvard College v. Amory re-
flected rather more the customs of preceding generations than a
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true anticipation of what was lying ahead. The rule had barely been
announced when it began to be narrowed in practice in important
respects. The process of narrowing was speeded, also, by the fact
that during the remaining years of the nineteenth century the
economy of the United States was also maturing and settling down.
And in some parts of the Republic legal thinking had become more
conservative than that of Massachusetts. The investment rule in
New York, for example, was stated in terms not far different from
those promulgated in Massachusetts. But in 1869 the New York
court narrowed the rule in a most restrictive way in the leading
case of King v. Talbot.2 That opinion stated, emphatically, that no
prudent man would purchase or retain for trust management any
share of stock, as contrasted with a bond or other obligation having
a fixed maturity. For some mysterious reason acquisition or reten-
tion of any equity in real estate was permitted but purchase of
shares of stock were declared to be a speculative and dangerous
delegation of the trustee's control.
The tide was turning, with the ripening years, toward English
conservatism. Even the Massachusetts court began placing certain
limitations upon its own language. It made certain motions towards
emphasis upon the doctrine of diversification, which had not been
mentioned in the original statement of the rule, and which, while
very sound in itself, could, if the court had not later escaped the
noose which it really laid for itself, have proved to be a most
troublesome restrictive requirement. It fell into the error, chiefly
by dicta but widely copied by trust commentators all over the Vic-
torian world, of heavy and undue emphasis upon the protection of
the rights of future principal beneficiaries at the expense of the
life tenants, who were, obviously, the chief objects of the testator's
bounties. It followed the trend, with the passage of the later nine-
teenth century years, in short, of regarding the trustee as essen-
tially a conservator. It emphasized "safety of principal" at the ex-
pense of reasonable yields of income. The result was inevitable. It
is fair to say that as of the year 1900 the trustees of the United
States, speaking broadly, were little more than a pallid reflection
of their own forefathers. They were doing a distinctly pedestrian
job.
Yet the trustees of 1900 are not to be unduly criticized. They
were in step with those times. Social customs, business mores and
government protocol were heavily laden with "taboos." So also was
the fiduciary management field. There were numerous media of in-
vestment available to the fiduciaries of the American nation, as well
as to the fiduciaries of England, but no cause had yet arisen for de-
manding their use. The trust was, by and large, the rich man's tool.
2 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
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The fiduciary problem, on both sides of the water, was chiefly a
matter of placing the accumulated savings of previous generations
of leading families in a sort of "guaranteed" retirement, where they
would be "safely" preserved for dozens and even hundreds of years
to come.
The sterilization of accumulated trust funds which characteriz-
ed the "golden age" rule may have done no harm during Victorian
days. Certainly there were few commentators who thought it evil.
Massachusetts adhered to its liberal viewpoint but most of the Re-
public did not, and even that resolute Massachusetts protagonist
Augustus Peabody Loring admitted, in 1898, that
In the hands of a good trustee the Massachusetts rule is un-
doubtedly superior, since it gives him a larger opportunity
to use his skill and ability as a financier for the benefit of
his beneficiaries; but undoubtedly the English rule, or New
York rule, is better adapted to inexperienced or ignorant
trustees, as much less is left to their discretion, and unfor-
tunately trustees are too often appointed from considera-
tions of friendship, and not from consideration of their dis-
cretion or business ability.
THE PmuoD or Uws-rmm qT
Space does not permit a description of the dramatic growth of
security transaction on the American markets from the year 1898
to the close of the 1920's. Most of us have clear enough memories,
however, of the glamorous 1920's. Nor shall we soon forget how
after an exuberant rise of unparalleled intensity and duration the
market "broke" in October of 1929, and the rose-tinted skies of the
American new era became suddenly and darkly overcast. The per-
iod of unsettlement which ensued has continued with very brief
interludes until the present day. As a result of the dislocations of
the Second World War and the threats of a Third, it appears likely
that we shall continue to move through troubled times for years to
come. And it is more than likely that the "swings" in values upon
the security markets will continue to alternate in successive re-
sponse to whatever deflationary or inflationary influences may turn
out from time to time to be prevailing.
At all events the historical "averages" declare that following
hard upon the initial break in the autumn months of 1929, there
ensued a deflationary decline which was first felt in the values of
equity participations. Bond values, during this initial period, tended
to hold, even to improve, their relative positions. The investment
"conservatives" had their brief, if lugubrious, innings. But even-
tually, and without much delay, there arrived a period of depres-
sion so deep that the values of negotiable covenants of all sorts,
secured and unsecured, were themselves grievously affected. Great
aggregations of "guaranteed" mortgage bonds stood in default and
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railroad bonds declined with discouraging rapidity. Farm mortgage
auctions produced scenes of bitter defiance to the law. The statu-
tory moratorium became the order of the day. Gold rapidly resumed
its prime place in the affections of men. Money stood next in public
preference. All forms of money's worth, indeed, with the notable
exception of a few commodities, were viewed with suspicion and
mistrust.
Upon evidence of the hoarding of gold, and eventually of
money, the Federal Government stepped in and closed the banks,
devalued the gold content of the dollar, inaugurated an extensive
and continuing policy of cheap money and assumed for all prac-
tical purposes a working control over the security markets. From
that critical low point there ensued a period of slow but accelerat-
ing credit and currency inflation. This process has continued to the
point, at the date of these comments, where one hears, predomi-
nately, discussion of the following topics in work-a-day trust circles:
1. Shall we be able to prevent an uncontrollable upward
spiraling of the costs of living and consequent uncontroll-
able diminution of the purchasing power of the fixed-con-
tent dollar?
2. Shall we ever be able to expect the yield from fixed income
capital to resume its former comparative position vis-a-vis
the yield from equity participations?
These questions bespeak an uncertainty among men of pru-
dence, intelligence, and discretion about the values of the things
that they find for sale in the financial world and, consequently,
about the things which they hold in their fiduciary portfolios. All
of us are now required to steer our craft, not by the fixed and re-
liable stars of old, nor yet by the magnetic compass for whose ex-
pected deviation we can compensate, but by dead reckoning solely,
the color of the water, the size and shape of the visible reefs, and
the set of the tide so far as we can discern it. We are passing, in
other words, through the sort of period to which Chief Justice Rugg
referred, with dignified understatement, in Kimball v. Whitney,3
when he spoke of "new financial institutions and business customs,
changed commercial methods and practices, altered monetary us-
ages and investment combinations." We have rediscovered, more-
over, the eternal verity of Mr. Justice Putnam's sentence, "Do what
you will the capital is at hazard."4
4 Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick 446 (1830).
These developments have led to interesting discussions among
persons who are occupied in the trust field about the nature of the
duty of the modern trustee. It has been suggested, for example, that
the time may be at hand when the trustee must be prepared to take
3 233 Mass. 321, 331 (1919).
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into account and seek some compensating factor for fluctuations in
the purchasing power of the monetary standard.5 Distinctions have
been drawn between the functional approaches to the problem of
property management which are characteristic of various walks of
life. Shall the savings banker, for example, who deals with an obli-
gation to repay upon demand, be expected to use the same ap-
proach as the insurance company executive who has issued obliga-
tions to pay in dollars but who is to some degree protected by tables
of experience in mortality? Should the trustee, who has no fixed
maturity but whose fundamental duty is to apply the trust prop-
erty for the continued benefit of successive beneficiaries, adhere
to the same or to a different standard or approach? The question
has been asked whether it is any longer sufficient, as a discharge
of the fiduciary duty, to maintain values set in the opening inven-
tory over a prolonged period of years, regardless of development
in the surrounding economy. These questions are not easily an-
swered. Some have said that a trustee who undertakes to take into
account fluctuations in the purchasing power of the dollar runs the
risk of becoming a "gentleman adventurer" with other people's
money.6 Some say that a trustee who does not is sacrificing the life
tenants of the trust to remote remaindermen.
Certainly there is evidence that during the period of unsettle-
ment, which has characterized the second twenty-five years of the
twentieth century, the position of the life tenant has been re-examin-
ed and the duty of the trustee to some extent affected. By way of
introduction to consideration of the widespread reform in invest-
ment powers of the American trustee, which was originally induced
largely out of response to the plight of the life tenant (but which
now bids fair to do the remainderman an equally good turn), it may
be useful to notice some other changes in trust law and practice
which have been designed to increase the fruitfulness of the trust
device for the benefit of those nearest and dearest to the departed
head of family. It has, for example, now become fairly common to
remove from the income beneficiary part of the charges for man-
agement and to allocate that expense partly to principal.7 The Re-
statement and an increasing number of decisions now declare the
duty of the trustee, also, to make equitable allocation of the pro-
ceeds of delayed sale of unproductive real estate so that the income
5 See Shattuck and Headley, Whither Trusteeship? (a debate), 89 TRUsTS
Am ESTATES 92-5, 120-5 (1950).
6 See Headley, Trustees or "Gentlemen Adventurers"?, 88 TRUSTS Am Es-
TATES 91 (1949).
7 This is sometimes accomplished by statute as for example in Massachu-
setts where allocation is left to the discretion of the Probate Court. MASS.GL.
(Ter. Ed.) Ch.206, s.16.
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tenant is no longer burdened with all carrying charges without
eventual reimbursement.8 So, also, in practice draftsmen have
learned to authorize fiduciaries to use, apply and expend principal
for the protection of income tenants. The concept of conservation of
principal for distribution intact to future generations is certainly
weakening even if it must be said, still, that most trust authorities
and decisions get the cart before the horse.9
THE TRUST INVESTmENT RULE
LEGAL LIST VS. PRUDENT MA
In 1900 the individual states of the United States had divided
themselves unevenly between allegiance to the Massachusetts rule
(a distinct minority) and the New York or "legal list" rule (a
strong majority). The New York rule states represented vastly
greater accumulations of capital. Loring's estimate, made in 1898,
that the Massachusetts rule states were in the majority was certain-
ly inaccurate. The key states, in an economic sense, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Illinois, Cailfornia and the entire bloc
of Northwest territory jurisdictions, had carefully limited their
trustees to "legal lists." The same restriction, or something like it,
was embodied in the constitutions of a handful of states. The legal
lists were similar in nature to the savings bank lists which had long
been established almost everywhere, even in Massachusetts. They
were prepared by the legislative or executive branch of govern-
ment. They were designed to protect the beneficiary from Loring's
"inexperienced or ignorant trustees." The eligible investments con-
sisted largely of government and municipal obligations but they
sometimes included "high quality" bonds and notes selected in ac-
cordance with prescribed formulae. Equity participations were al-
most universally excluded. Common stocks were emphatically
"taboo." The trustee who purchased or retained unauthorized se-
curities became in substance a guarantor against depreciation.
In the legal list states, after the boom and during the depres-
sion years of the 1930's, a number of factors became operative
which focussed attention upon investment restrictions. The first of
these factors was the startling increase, beginning in the 1920's, in
the accumulation of fiduciary funds. The nation had become, after
World War I, a growing aggregation of modest "capitalists." The
trust, moreover, was obviously becoming the average man's tool.
According to figures compiled in 1938 by the Comptroller of the
Currency the growth of trust funds in national banks alone had in-
creased from $922,328,677 in 26,053 trusts as of June 1926 to $9,419,-
8 RESTATmE, TRUSTS, s.241; 20 B.U.LY.Ev. No. 3 (June 1940).
9 The rule stated in Harvard College v. Amory was of course balanced in
nature; it is not often remembered that it placed income considerations first
in order of expression.
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017,042 in 135,655 trusts as of June 1938, an increase of 921 per
cent in trust assets and 466 per cent in the number of trusts.1° The
state banking institutions engaged in the trust business, about equal
in number to the national banks, enjoyed a similar boom. And while
individual trusteeships were believed to be declining in relative im-
portance they nevertheless continued to contribute enormously to
the total volume of fiduciary business. Thus an important fraction
of the nation's capital had found its way into trust portfolios. The
trust men of the country worked very hard and very steadily not
merely to increase their business but to do it with prudence and in-
telligence.11 The public was in a mood to provide for the future, es-
pecially after the lesson of 1929. Life insurance trusts became
common.
But moving hand in hand with this striking growth of trust
business during the period of depression there was an equally strik-
ing diminution in the quantity of "eligible" securities. Great por-
tions of the legal list selections disqualified themselves by automatic
operation of the formulae under which they were chosen and were
removed from the list. In New York State alone the volume of
"legal investments" declined from approximately $7,600,000,000 in
1931 to approximately $2,580,000,000 in 1939.
These factors, taken together with open market purchases by
the Federal Reserve Bank, expansion of silver purchases, devalua-
tion of the dollar, adoption of a national policy of low interest rates,
and the general lessening of public confidence in bond values served
to place the income tenant in an unenviable position. Income was
declining; prices were going up.
There was, moreover, a social aspect to the problem. The en-
terprise capital market was languishing. In the words of Edmund
Burke, Jr., "Equity money is dynamic and debt money is static."
Even the conservative minded S. E. C. stated its belief that, " A
reasonable capital structure calls for a substantial amount of com-
mon stock equity both as a protective cushion for the bonds and
preferred stock and to prevent temporary declines in earning from
resulting in receivership."12 Yet a report of the Public Utilities Di-
10 Comptroller of the Currency. 76th Annual Report. Pg. 3.11 These statistics have been limited, for purposes of historical pertinency,
to the decade 1930-1940. Trust growth has proceeded almost geometrically
since. For an estimate of the extent of trust business in National Banks as
of December 30, 1950 see Trusts and Estates, September, 1951. The total is
nearly four times that of 1938. It is to be remembered that these totals do not
include trusts in about 1500 state chartered banks or in the hands of individu-
als, or charitable and educational funds, "corporate" trusts, society funds or
the like. I estimate that the total aggregations of trust funds in the nation as
of this writing may exceed two hundred billions of dollars.
126 SEC Axx REP.
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vision of the S. E. C. gave a picture in 1941 of the five previous years
of public utilities financing. The total sum of that financing amount-
ed to $5,890,000,000, in round figures. Of this total bonds and notes
accounted for approximately 95.1 per cent, preferred stocks 4.7 per
cent, and common stocks only 2/10 of 1 per cent. Free enterprise
requires equity capital. The social question that arose in the minds
of lawyers and legislators was whether it was entirely safe, let
alone wise, to continue to exclude from the enterprise capital mar-
ket the entire aggregation of fiduciary funds of great centers of com-
merce like New York and Chicago.
In the meantime trustees in those states which had followed
the Massachusetts trust investment rule had found the going much
easier than their "legal list" brethren. The task of selection re-
nained as difficult as ever, to be sure, perhaps even more so, but
the investment choice was comparatively wide and the opportunity
to balance a stuttering bond yield by utilization of the relatively
higher income derived from equity participations, at reduced values,
was always at hand. Needless to say the lot of the life tenants was
happier in the Massachusetts Rule states than in the "legal list"
states. The yield in portfolios which were limited to legal invest-
ments did not greatly exceed 2 per cent on the average, while it
was still comparatively easy to maintain a 4 per cent yield under
the Massachusetts rule. That difference of one and a half, or two,
per cent was fifteen hundred to two thousand dollars a year in a
trust of one hundred thousand dollars.
The combined effect of these factors, beginning with the year
1939, led to a series of desertions from the ranks adherent to the
"legal list" rule.
Connecticut adopted the Massachusetts rule by statute in
1939. Missouri took what amounted to the same step by court de-
cision in 1940. New Hampshire greatly relaxed its long established
strict practice in 1941. The trust division of the American Bankers
Association in February 1942 devoted a part of its annual meeting
to the subject and ended by instructing its legislative committee to
prepare a model statute designed to enact the Massachusetts rule.
The present writer prepared the statute in the form set out later in
this article. The governing words were those of the court in Har-
vard College v. Amory. No way was found to improve them.
Results were almost immediate and have been continuing in
marked fashion ever since.'-
A tabulation of American jurisdictions which follow the pru-
dent man rule, as of this writing, either by judicial decision or legis-
13 The American Bar Association Section of Real Estate, Trust and Probate
Law also appointed a continuing committee to further this reform and there
have been local committees in many states.
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lative action taken prior to the drafting of the model statute, or by
subsequent adoption of the model statute (sometimes with slight
variations) is as follows:
A. The Prudent Man Rule States (prior to 1940).
*1939 Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stats. 1949, § 6893)
*1890 Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. 1946, § 386.020)
1884 Maryland McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884)
1830 Massachusetts Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick.
446 (1830).
*1937 Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 487.232)
1940 Missouri Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466
(1940)
1928 North Carolina Sheets v. J. G. Flynt Tobacco Co.,
195 N. C. 149 (1928)
1886 Rhode Island Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321
(1886)
1908 Vermont Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405 (1908)
B. The Prudent Man Rule States, by statute (after 1940) in
some form or other, 100 per cent or less:
*1941 New Hampshire
1943 California
1943 Delaware
1943 Minnesota
1945 Illinois
1945 Maine
1945 Texas
1947 Nevada
1947 Oregon
1947 Washington
1949 Idaho
1949 Kansas
1949 Oklahoma
1951 Utah
1951 Colorado
(N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, c. 363, § 17,
as amended by Laws 1949, c. 135, §
1) 50%
(Cal. Civil Code, § 2261, as amend-
ed by Laws 1943, c. 811) 100%
(Del. Rev. Code, c. 117, § 35, as
amended by Laws 1943, c. 171 and
Laws 1947, c. 268) 100%
(Minn. Stat. Ann., § 501.125) 100%
(Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 148, §§ 32 to 32.1c.)
100%
(Me. Rev. Stat. c. 147, §§ 17a-d, as
amended by Laws 1951 HB.102)
100%
(Tex. Stats. (Vernon Supp.) §
7425b-46, as amended by Laws 1945,
c. 77, § 13) 100%
(Nev. Laws 1947, c. 51, p. 81) 100%
(Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 73-103a
to 73-103d, as inserted by Laws 1947,
c. 523, and amended by Laws 1949,
c. 220, § 1) 100%
(Wash. Laws 1947, c. 100) 100%
(Ida. Laws 1949, c. 36) 100%
(Kan. Laws 1949, c., 319 as amend-
ed Laws 1951 HB. 71, § 1) 100%
(Okla. Stats. Ann., Title 60, § 161)
100%
(Utah Laws 1951, HB. 51) 100%
(Col. Laws 1951, NB. 272) 100%
*The dates are those of the first adoption of a Prudent Man
Statute. The Kentucky and Michigan statutes have been
somewhat altered by later amendments.
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1951 New Mexico (N. M. Laws 1951, c. 41) 100%
1951 Tennessee (Tenn. Acts 1951, c. 125) 100%
*1951 New Jersey (N. J. Rev. Stats. 1943, § 24-601 as
amended 1951) 40%
*1951 North Dakota (N. D. Rev. Code of 1943, § 6.0515
as amended 1951) 50% rule for cor-
porate fiduciaries only.
*1951 South Carolina (S. C. Code of 1942, § 9051 as
amended 1951) 30%
C. The Legal List States (of various types).
The list of legal list states, so formidable as of the year 1900,
has now dwindled to a small minority of the jurisdictions in the
United States. Those legal lists states, which do not permit equi-
ties in any form, are as follows:
Alabama (Code, 1940, as amended, Title 58, §
47)
Arkansas (Stats. 1947, Ann., as amended, §§
106,221)
Florida (Stats. 1949, as amended, § 518.01)
Georgia (Code, 1933, as amended, § 108417
et seq.)
Iowa (Code, 1950, as amended, § 682.23)
Louisiana (Rev. Stats., 1950, as amended, §
9:2061)
Montana (Constitutional prohibition)
Ohio (Gen. Code, 1910, as amended, §
10506-41) Legislation in 1951 vetoed
by Governor.
West Virginia (Code, 1931, as amended, Art. 6, c.
44, § 2)
Wyoming (Comp. Stats. 1945, as amended, §
8-301) (Constitutional prohibition)
In some jurisdictions the "legal lists" include some kinds of
preferred and, or, common stocks, but typically only a limited
amount can be invested in equities. In addition, the relatively few
equities which are eligible must meet certain fixed requirements,
such as high investment service ratings, exchange listings, earnings
and dividends records, etc. This group of jurisdiction includes:
District of Columbia (Local Civil Rules of Dist. Ct., Rule
23)
Indiana (Laws 1945, as amended, c. 184, § 1)
Nebraska (Rev. Stats. 1943, as amended, § 24-
601)
*The question is, of course, whether states which have a per-
centage rule belong in a "legal list" or in a Prudent Man
column.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
New York (Personal Property Law, § 21 (1),
as amended by Laws 1950, c. 464)
(a "legal list" state with a limited
35% Prudent Man Rule amend-
ment)
Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon) tit. 20, §§
821.1 to 821.20, as amended by Laws
1951, S.B.11, §1)
Virginia (Code, 1950, as amended, § 26-40)
Preferred stocks only.
Wisconsin (Stats. 1945, as amended, § 320.01)
In Arizona, Mississippi and South Dakota there is no specific-
ally declared fiduciary investment law, and fiduciaries in these
states do not customarily purchase equities or investment company
shares without specific authorization.
A glance at the above tables which show only four American
states definitely in the Prudent Man column as of the year 1900, and
only nine definitely in that column by 1940, reveals the sweeping
extent of the reform in the past dozen years.
It seems clear, now, that the standard laid down in Harvard
College v. Amory is destined to be the American trustee's guide for
years to come.
COLLATERAL DEVELOPmENTS.
THE CoMMoN TRUST FUND. THE INVESTMENT TRUST.
During the same period of years which have marked extension
of the Prudent Man Rule there have risen, and flourished, in the
American states two interesting methods of collective investment.
One, the Common Trust Fund, was especially designed for use in
the fiduciary field. The other, the Investment Company or Invest-
ment Trust, is eminently suited for use in that field and is being
legally qualified for that purpose by increasing degrees.
The Common Trust Fund, which offers the advantages of con-
centrated and economical trust management and a high degree of
diversification to multiple trust accounts in the hands of a single
fiduciary, usually corporate, is now legal in thirty states and at a
recent date was said to embrace $634,315,895 in 37,008 accounts.1 4
Discussion of its characteristics and virtues must be reserved for
another time and place. It is plain, however, that the Common Trust
Fund has earned a definite place in the American fiduciary field
and is here to stay.
The shares of investment companies and investment trusts also
fill a definite need in the field, particularly where the Common
Trust Fund is not available. Smaller corporate fiduciaries and the
thousands of individual fiduciaries of the nation must also have
better diversification and the benefits of expert management, par-
14 Operating Economies, 90 TausTs AND EsTATEs 100 (1951).
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ticularly as the numbers of relatively small investment accounts of
a fiduciary nature increase and the complexities of modern invest-
ment techniques grow more bafing. There has been discussion of
the legality of purchase and retention of this sort of investment by
the trustees of the nation. It now appears probable that even in the
absence of specific authorization set forth in the instrument the
courts will permit this sort of purchase. 5 A substatnial number of
states have recently enacted legislation permitting purchase and
retention of shares of investment companies and investment trusts,
sometimes in the form of an amendment to the Prudent Man Rule, 16
sometimes as a specific extension of a legal list, or as an express
permission for the permitted fraction of equities.'7
Discussion of the characteristics and virtues of this type of
modern fiduciary investment must, like discussion of the Common
Trust Fund, be reserved for another time and place. These two col-
lateral methods of collective investment of American fiduciary funds
are increasingly recognized, however, as the handmaidens of the
Prudent Man Rule and must be noted with interest by any student
of developments in that field.
THE PRUDEn T MAN RULE Ix OPERATION
Massachusetts has recorded, in the decisions of her Supreme
Judicial Court, a century and a quarter of experience with the rule
announced by Harvard College v. Amory. There have been exten-
sive notations of the results.' I made the attempt, in 1945, to an-
notate the rule, clause by clause, in the light of the Massachusetts
decisions.19
The established pattern, as woven in Massachusetts, is not
Is Stevenson, Shares in Mutual Investment Funds (1946); Shattuck, The
Legal Propriety of Investment by American Fiduciaries in the Shares of Boston-
Type Open-End Investment Trusts, 25 B.UTL.REv. 1 (1945); Stevenson, Fiduci-
aries and Investment Company Shares, 89 TRusTs A D ESTATES 228 (1950); May
Trustees Invest in Investment Trusts?, 89 TRusTs AN ESTATES 396 (1950).
1 6 Colorado, Kansas, Maine, New Mexico, Tennessee and Washington.
17 New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Carolina and Wiscon-
sin.
Is See, e.g. J. J. Robinson and H. Robinson, Trustee's Investments in Massa-
chusetts, 14 B.U.Lzv. 88 (1934); R. S. Walker, Investment of Trust Funds
under the so-called "Massachusetts Rule" 13 CoNN. B. J. 237 (1939); J. L. Rob-
son, Investment of Trust Funds in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, 21 J. Comp.
Lna. 3rd ser. 205 (1939); Prudent Investor Rule in the Investment of Trust
Funds, 16 Taw. L. Q. 216 (1942); R. Neill, Jr., Prudent Man Rule of Trust In-
vestments, 82 TRusTs Am ESTATES 90 (1946); R. P. Chapman, Investing Trust
Funds under the Prudent Man Rule, 23 TRUST BULL. 2 (1944); E. R. Lewis, The
Prudent Man Investment Rule, 35 ILL. B. J. 65 (1946); F. G. Sayre, Prudent
Man Rule for Trust Investments, 88 TusTs AND ESTATES 663 (1949), 89 TRUSTs
AND ESTATES 706 (1950).
19 See 25 B.U.LJRV. (Nov. 1945).
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greatly different from that of any other part of the nation. The rule,
so far as I know, has been regarded with admiration wherever it
has been adopted and placed in operation. No decision by the high-
est court of any state has been more widely cited elsewhere than
Harvard College v. Amory. A modest collection of cases, suggestive
of the rule in operation, is appended to this article. I see no evidence
that any of these cases have distorted or abused the rule in any
important particular. The degree of its fruitfulness in the American
fiduciary field will, of course, depend upon how it is handled by the
fiduciaries, the lawyers and the courts of the future. It is entirely
malleable in nature and completely suitable for changing times and
circumstances.
CoxTmLIATioN or ThE FuTuim
Consideration of the economic and social circumstances which
hold sway at the expiration of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and of the legal currents which have asserted themselves in
the American fiduciary field with sufficient strength so that they
may property be called "trends," suggests the possibility of some
of the following developments, all of which are pertinent to a study
of trust investment practices:
First: Private aggregations of trust capital are likely to grow
in total size. The persistence and ingenuity of estate planning adver-
tising, the unsettling condition of private and public affairs, the
availability of new and interesting investment media, the increasing
burdens of taxes and an enlarged sense of family responsibility may
be expected to contribute to increasing emphasis upon planning for
a "rainy day."
Second: Public and charitable aggregations of trust capital will
also increase in substantial measure. The doing of good works is
characteristic, always, of a maturing society; the American people
are, moreover, instinctively generous. The tax structure has served,
and will continue to serve, to enhance the resolution of our citizens
to provide protection for their less fortunate brethren.
Third: The instruments and statutes which control manage-
ment of trust funds, public and private, will be drawn and enacted
with an eye to an unpredictable future, rather than with the con-
viction, as in Victorian days, that the future can be foreseen with
reasonable accuracy. Thus fiduciary discretions may be expected
to be enlarged; powers of alteration, amendment and use and ap-
plication of principal will be common rather than exceptional; in-
vestment powers will be broad and elastic in an increasing degree.
The Prudent Man Rule, possibly somewhat broadened, is almost
certain to be the trust investment rule of the next fify years.
Fourth: The inter vivos trust may confidently be expected to
find increasing use in domestic and commercial areas. It bids fair to
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take root as a sort of mercantile specialty on its own, as the insur-
ance policy has done, and to be applied in myriad forms, to specific
purposes. It may well become the "poor man's tool."
Fifth: Because the average man's family trust is likely to be of
modest size, and the substantial Victorian portfolio a distinct relic
of the past, one must expect an increasing experimentation with all
sorts of collective investment devices. The Common Trust Fund is
certainly here to stay and will probably extend itself markedly
throughout the banking system. The modern Investment Company
will continue to attract fiduciary participation and, as it gains in
stature and confidence, may come to provide both a complete in-
vestment service for trusts of modest size and a supplementary ser-
vice for larger aggregations of trust capital.
Sixth: The accumulated savings of the Republic are more like-
ly than not, regardless of recessions and booms, to find dominant in-
vestment in equity participations, as contrasted with mortgages,
bonds and notes of hand. The trust function is not adequately dis-
charged by heavy possession of fixed income bearing securities hav-
ing a fixed maturity, especially when one considers that the broad
record of advancing civilization is inflationary in character. The
trustee's prime practical concern will be not to safeguard principal
but to keep reasonably abreast of the times in purchasing power
and values. A sense of cautious responsibility will always dictate,
to be sure, a somewhat different attitude on the part of the trustee
from that of the "gentleman adventurer," notably with relation to
diversification of classes and individual holdings of securities, but
it is safe to say that the Victorian definition of the prohibited "busi-
ness man's risk" will undergo a softening change. The essential
market for fixed income bearing securities is more likely to be
found not in the fiduciary field but among the property management
institutions which are themselves confronted with fixed maturities,
or are subject to demands in dollars, such as savings banks, build-
ing and loan cooperative societies and insurance companies.
Seventh: Because so many American business men are essen-
tially unliquid in their financial affairs, having placed all or a very
large part of their eggs in one basket, and because the operation of
tax laws makes it almost impossible to gain a position of liquidity
without heavy sacrifice of values or contribution to the tax collect-
or, there will be a tendency to "hang on" to family properties of
high earning power and low marketability. The fiduciaries of the
Republic may, therefore, find themselves increasingly occupied
with managerial functions of a commercial and industrial charac-
ter. They must be prepared to operate competitive enterprises in
trust form and to conform their administrative and compensation
schedules and procedures accordingly.
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Eighth: Since the duty of the trustee of the future is likely to
be one of leadership in new and strange areas, all in a highly tech-
nical world, one may expect a heavier emphasis upon "profession-
alism" in the trust world. A lawyer will not expect to be a success-
ful trustee merely because he is a member of the bar, nor a bank
merely because it holds a charter, nor an investment broker merely
because he deals in stocks and bonds. Fiduciary compensation
schedules will inevitably be subject to wide variations, depending
upon the nature of the task in hand; ancient rules bearing upon
delegation of duty and responsibility will require modification to
suit growing practices of committee and agency performance; the
risk of individual liability of the trustee, saving always in the sac-
rosanct area of his duty and loyalty, will certainly be diminished to
a character more resembling that of the director-business executive
than that of the old fashioned fiduciary.
Ninth: Certain practical and legal assumptions of the trust
world must be altered to fit the future fiduciary prospect. Profes-
sional fiduciaries have tended to assume, for example, that sole
trusteeship will be the order of the new day; it seems more likely,
however, that committee operation is desirable, with division of
duties and responsibilities. One may fairly expect, also, that the
ancient legal rule of unanimity of decision in decision and action
will give way to the more workable business and social, or political
rule of decision by the majority. A fixed schedule of fees will not
be applicable to this new order of things. Responsibility for the acts
or omissions of a co-fiduciary or inferior will be lessened. The
heavy emphasis upon conservation of principal at the expense of
the life or income tenant will continue to diminish. Business prac-
tices relating to reserves for obsolescence and depletion will be im-
ported into the trust law. The trust vehicle will, in short, find a way
to take an unhandicapped place as a modem and competitive Amer-
ican business device.
The Prudent Man Rule may be thought of, in this aspect of
things, as a bright star in a newly discovered galaxy. Maitland con-
sidered the invention of the trust concept to have been a major,
perhaps the greatest, achievement of the English legal mind. Scott
adds that the use of the trust is limited only by the imagination of
the draftsman. Given these virtues and the elasticity of adminis-
tration which is promised by the Prudent Man Rule, one can expect
the trust to reach full stature in American hands.
A2Pr=Dix A
THE MODEL PRUDENT MAN RULE STATUTE
wrm THE INVEsTMENT COpaPANY AMENDWMNT
SECTION 1. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging,
retaining, selling and managing property for the benefit of another,
[Vol. 12
1951] DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 509
a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care, under the circum-
stances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and in-
telligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income as well as the prob-
able safety of their capital. Within the limitations of the foregoing
standard, a fiduciary is authorized to acquire and retain every kind
of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment,
specifically including but not by way of limitation, bonds, deben-
tures and other corporate obligations, and stocks, preferred or
common, and securities of any open-end or closed-end management
type investment company or investment trust registered under the
Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, as from time to time
amended, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence ac-
quire or retain for their own account.
SECTION 2. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed
as authorizing any departure from, or variation of, the express
terms or limitations set forth in any will, agreement, court order or
other instrument creating or defining the fiduciary's duties and
powers, but the terms "legal investment" or "authorized invest-
ment" or works of similar import, as used in any such instrument,
shall be taken to mean any investment which is permitted by the
terms of section 1 hereof.
SECTION 3. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed
as restricting the power of a court of proper jurisdiction to permit a
fiduciary to deviate from the terms of any will, agreement, or other
instrument relating to the acquisition, investment, reinvestment,
exchange, retention, sale or management of fiduciary property.
SECTION 4. The provisions of this act shall govern fiduciaries
acting under wills, agreements, court orders and other instruments
now existing or hereafter made.
APPwmix B
Note: A collection of Massachusetts authorities, which I hope
would give a fair picture of the operation of the Massachusetts Pru-
dent Man Trust Investment Rule as of November, 1945, was printed
in the Boston University Law Review, Volume 25, No. 4. In the
course of that discussion I attempted to illustrate the Rule by an-
notating its separate clauses as follows:
(1) "All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he
shall conduct himself faithfully
(2) and exercise a sound discretion.
(3) He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and in-
telligence
(4) manage their own affairs,
(5) not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds,
(6) consideirng the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be invested."
It would have been an impossible task then, and it remains an
impossible task, to extend a comprehensive inquiry into jurisdic-
tions other than Massachusetts in anything less than a full volume.
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This appendix, therefore, can do nothing more than set forth a very
few interesting recent cases, drawn from Massachusetts and other
jurisdictions, which suggest the application of the Rule and the
practice under some of the foregoing clauses.
(1) ".... he shall conduct himself faithfully . .
The trustee is to be selfless; he is to work exclusively in the
intersts of those who have present or future beneficial interests in
the trust. This is the uniform rule in all Prudent Man jurisdictions.
In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 A. 2d 234 (R. I.
1949), the testator gave his widow and the Trust Company, as trus-
tees, broad investment discretion, and authorized them to retain
securities owned by him and to participate in reorganizations. The
estate included large blocks of the Trust Company and of the Na-
tional City Bank. When the Trust Company affiliated itself with
the Bank, the Trust Company lost its right to retain the shares re-
ceived from the affiliation. The rule of the Cannon case was thus
reaffirmed. See also Hutchings v. Louisville Trust Co., 303 Ky. 147,
197 S.W. 2d 83 (1946).
Profits derived from the trustee's self-dealing will accrue to
the trust: "recovery may be had by the benficiary even though he
has suffered no damage and even though the trustee may have
acted in good faith." Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S. W.
2d 377 (1945); Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Kelley, 333 IlM. App. 119, 76 N. E. 2d 820 (1948).
Any dealing by the trustee with the subject matter of the
trust will be scrutinized closely, but a transaction that is open, fair
and above board, made with the consent of the beneficiaries after
full disclosure to them, may possibly gain the court's sanction.
Kuhn v. Zepp, 355 Mo. 295, 196 S. W. 2d 249 (1946).
The trust instrument may authorize the trustee as an individual
to purchase trust assets, Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs., 312 Ky. 405,
227 S. W. 2d 899 (1950), and such authorization does not violate
public policy. Morris v. The Broadview, Inc., 328 IM. App. 267, 65
N. E. 2d 605 (1946).
There are instances of unabashed disloyalty; the remedy is
severe. Sauvage v. Gallaway, 329 I. App. 38, 66 N. E. 2d 740 (1946)
(operating a competitive business); McCleary v. Lewis, 397 IlM. 76,
72 N. E. 2d. 862 (1947) (concealing the purchase of trust property).
But usually the trustee falls victim of a prohibition which is design-
ed to remove all temptation toward self-dealing. Wootten v. Woot-
ten, 151 F. 2d 147 (C.C.A. 10th, 1945), s.c. 159 F. 2d 567 (C.C.A.
10th 1947), (individual ownership of majority interest in corpora-
tion, shares of which are also held by trust).
It might be argued that courts increasingly accustomed to a
generous attitude in their examination of investments will inevit-
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ably tend to "erode" the "punctilio of honor" historically demanded
of a trustee. In re Keyston's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 223, 227 P. 2d
17 (1951) might for example, be cited as having some factual simil-
arity to the Wootten case, but with a more lenient holding. What
may be loosely described as technical conflicts of interests were
also held not to be breaches of trust in Security Trust Co. v. Apple-
ton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946), and Warner v. King, 337
Ill App. 99, 85 N. E. 2d 196 (1949). But no trend can be found as
yet. Each case stands on its own facts.
Two cases serve to illustrate: In re Schlemm's Estate, 11 N. J.
Super. 286, 78 A. 2d 156 (1951), surcharged the corporate trustee for
retention of its own stock. In re Trust under Will of Comstock, 219
Minn. 325, 17 N. W. 2d 656 (1945), found no breach of trust by the
corporate trustee which retained stock of corporations to which it
had made large loans and the directorates of which were interlock-
ing with itself. Both may be described as close cases; the decisions
could conceivably have turned either way. Nevertheless, the facts
are distinguishable: In the Schlemm case, the trustee held its own
stock; in the Comstock case it held stock in which it was more re-
motely interested. In the one case, the stock constituted the bulk of
the estate, in the other it made up slightly more than half the trust
assets. The Schlemm trustee retained for a longer period than did
the Comstock fiduciary. The former acted in its own complete dis-
cretion; the latter obtained the informed approval of the life ten-
ant. In brief, there is an aura of unsullied honesty about the Com-
stock trustee's actions which is not so clearly evidenced in the
Schlemm case. It cannot fairly be said that the standards of one of
these courts are lower or higher than those of the other. The test,
as the Minnesota court said in the Comstock case, is whether or not
the trustee's position is such that he is "interfered with or prevent-
ed from acting fairly, impartially, and honestly and for the best in-
terests of the trust estate and the beneficiaries thereof."
(2) '... and exercise a sound discretion . . ."
Indiscretion, of course, covers a multitude of sins. It may range
from doing nothing, or little, to doing something carelessly or dis-
honestly. In Sauvage v. Galaway, 331 M. App. 309, 73 N. E. 2d 133
(1947), the court found that a proposed sale of the trust's most pro-
ductive asset was in fact an attempt to cripple the trust for the
benefit of a competing business owned by the trustee's wife. The
trustee was "indiscreet." He was obviously "not acting in good
faith and within the limits of sound discretion, but rather arbitrar-
ily and unreasonably."
His purpose may be honest but his judgment clearly bad. So
when he determines to exchange trust assets for valueless certifi-
cates, (Hopkins v. Loeber, 332 IMI. App. 140, 74 N. E. 2d 39 (1947),
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
or to give away trust property (Hendrick v. Mitchell, 320 Mass. 155,
69 N. E. 2d 466 (1946).
By and large, however, where the trust instrument grants a
broad discretion to the trustee in matters of judgment, the courts
will be slow to condemn a decision which, viewed after the event,
may seem dubious. A typical example is In re Trust under Will of
Comstock, 219 Minn. 325, 17 N. W. 2d 656 (1945), where more than
half the estate consisted of shares of two small corporations, and
concerning which the testator said, "It is my suggestion to the trus-
tee that said stock be gradually converted." The fiduciary held the
stock for a year as executor and for a year and a half as trustee.
Then came October, 1929. The court found no abuse of discretion;
"Cases of this kind must be viewed, not restrospectively, but from
the position in which the trustee found itself in a suddenly upset
financial world."
A bona fide decision not to sell trust property, even though
coupled with a decision to take advantage of a granted authority to
hold an individual interest in the trust, does not necessarily con-
stitute a breach of trust. Victor v. Hillebrecht, 405 Ill. 264, 90 N. E.
2d 751 (1950).
"Sound discretion," however, is far from synonymous with
"good faith." In Merchants Nat. Bank of Aurora v. Frazier, 329 I1.
App. 191, 67 N. E. 2d 611 (1946), the trustee's decision, reached, no
doubt, in perfect good faith, to buy mortgage participations resulted
in surcharge when, in addition to the fact that they were bought
from itself, the mortgage was found to have no parity clause, other
notes were found to have prior maturities, and the participations
were therefore not first mortgages.
Courts everywhere take pains to warn, even while sanctioning
an exercise of discretion, that the trustee "will be held accountable
for any bad faith or abuse of discretion." Carter v. Kempton, 233
N.C. 1, 62 S.E. 2d 713 (1950). See In re Moir Hotel Co., 186 F. 2d 377
(1950); Ilari v. Ewing, 314 Ky. 182, 234 S. W. 2d 293 (1950); Estate
of Canfield, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 181 P. 2d 732 (1947); First National
Bank of Beaumont v. Howard, 223 S. W. 2d 694 (1949).
The diversification cases involve a most interesting question of
sound discretion. The two cases of New England Trust Co. v. Paine,
317 Mass. 542, 59 N. E. 2d 263 (1945), and 320 Mass. 482, 70 N. E. 2d
6 (1946), reiterate the established Massachusetts rule that overin-
vestment in a single security may be a breach of trust. While the
decision in the Paine cases rests on a broad interpretation of an
exculpatory clause, the court takes particular pains to point out that
"There is no hard and fast rule as to the extent of diversification re-
quired .... The principles set forth in Harvard College v. Amory,
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9 Pick. 446, 461 (1830), govern trustees in the matter of diversifica-
tion as in other problems of investment."
Worth mention also in the second Paine case is the discussion
of changing standards of the prudent investor. The investments
complained of, railroad stock, were largely made in the first decade
of the century. The court said,
The present rules for diversification of trust invest-
ments were not so well established at the turn of the cen-
tury as they now are. The amount to be invested in any
one venture still remains a matter of judgment and discre-
tion, although the judgment and discretion should now be
exercised within the more narrow limits usually employed
by trustees.
Similarly, in Warmack v. Crawford, 239 Mo. App. 709, 195 S. W.
2d 919 (1946), where 83 1/3 per cent of the estate consisted of com-
mon stock of a single corporation, and the trustee was authorized to
retain original holdings at his discretion, there was held to be no re-
quirement to diversify holdings unless the stock should appear to
be "not such an investment as a prudent man would make."
Since diversification is desirable it is not surprising that the
trustee should be allowed to obtain it without liability. See Kimball
v. New England Trust Co. 14 Conn. Supp. 432 (1947), where sales
for the purpose of diversification were made in a falling market. An
exculpatory clause excused all liability except for "wilful default,"
but the court pointed out that it was hard to find a loss in any event,
since the low market made it possible to buy new securities at a
favorable price.
A typical process of diversification is very likely to result in a
decrease of annual income; the testator's large holding of a favorite
small corporation will often produce a markedly higher return than
the standard prudent man portfolio. Although no case in point hap
been discovered, it is to be presumed that a court requiring diversi-
fication would be hard pressed to give the protesting widow any-
thing more substantial than sympathy. Compare the typical amor-
tization case, as for example, Brookings v. Mississippi Valley Trust
Co., 335 Mo. 513, 196 S. W. 2d 775, 167 A.L.R. 1424 (1946), and its
sequel, Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S. W.
2d 404 (1949).
On the other hand, the Kentucky court in Security Trust Co.
v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946), is not yet con-
vinced that failure to diversify is necessarily a sin of itself. The
trustee there retained about two-thirds of the trust estate in a single
holding of a well regarded bank stock. The bank's failure was en-
tirely unexpected. Said the court: the duty to diversify, "if one, is
merely an application of the general rule as to the care required of
a trustee in making investments, and whether it exists depends
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largely on circumstances .... We are not, under the circumstances
here, inclined to hold liability on the ground of failure to diversify,
even to the extent of concluding that the failure is to be considered
in connection with the more serious charges, or as in anywise con-
tributing to the loss."
There are other jurisdictions, notably Pennsylvania and New
York, where the existence and extent of the duty to diversify is far
from clear.
(3) "He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and in-
telligence . .. !
How shall we recognize the prudent, discreet and intelligent
man? Obviously he is to be described largely in terms of his ac-
tions. Equally obviously those actions must be judged in the light
of the action of other men of prudence, discretion and intelligence.
Is it possible, however, in general terms, to portray such a man in
a manner sufficiently understandable and accurate so that he will
stand as the accepted model of trustee behavior? I doubt it. The
law is not in clear agreement as to approach let alone as to result
To many courts, for example, a good deal will depend upon the
amount of experience and ability in financial and fiduciary affairs
the trustee chances to possess. In New Jersey it was recently stated
flatly that "a stricter standard of care and skill is applicable to cor-
porate and other professional trustees than that which is applicable
to individual non-professional trustees." In re Schlemm's Estate, 11
N. J. Super. 286, 78 A. 2d 156 (1951). Logically, this dual-standard
approach infers that the non-professional trustee may be pardoned
for a certain amount of imprudence, indiscretion and lack of intel-
ligence, an inference which can hardly be expected to appeal to
the court.
Elsewhere the distinction between amateur and professional
trustees is not so sharply drawn. Compare Security Trust Co. v.
Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946), where on the facts
it was held immaterial that the corporate trustee had loudly blown
its own horn as having special skill in fiduciary matters. The im-
plication of the Appleton case is that there is not so much a varia-
tion in objective standards as there is an obligation to make use of
whatever knowledge or skill may reasonably be available to the
trustee.
Certainly it is clear that the courts will look searchingly at the
corporate trustee to determine "whether it had the proper internal
organization, and whether that organization functioned properly."
Kimball v. New England Trust Co., 14 Conn. Supp. 432 (1947).
And of course the courts will be particularly alert for improper
delegation of discretion to individual officers of the trustees. See
New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N. E. 2d 263
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(1945), and In re Trust under Will of Comstock, 219 Minn. 325, 17
N. W. 2d 656 (1945). On the other hand, the individual trustee of
Ridgely v. Pfingstag, 188 Md. 209, 50 A. 2d 578 (1947), may argu-
ably have been allowed a somewhat lower standard when it was
said approvingly that he handled the trust funds "in the same way
he handled much larger amounts of his own money."
The difference, however it may be phrased, is sufficiently real
if met in practice. It could easily affect the decision of the court.
Some courts, in further illustration of the disagreement in
definition of the objective Prudent Man, will deal with a prudent
trustee rather than with a prudent individual. See In re Cook's
Will, 136 N.J. Eq. 123, 40 A. 2d 805 (1945): "I am therefore convinc-
ed that the nature of his undertaking to act for others is a practic-
able factor of significance in determining the responsiiblity of a fidu-
ciary." See also ScoTT, TRUSTS § 227. There is no warrant for that
distinction under the language of Harvard College v. Amory, and
there is no logical reason for it if all the words of the Prudent Man
Rule are given full effect, but there is nevertheless a constant temp-
tation, backed by British precedent, to fall into that error.
So far as I know all courts are agreed (although the cases
are few in number) that evidence of the conduct of other trustees
in the vicinity is admissible when the actions of the subject trustee
are being called into question. 25 B.U.L.REv. 307,328. ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 227. I can state, but by hearsay only, that trial courts outside of
Massachusetts have admitted evidence of the investment habits of
the community outside of strict fiduciary circles. This would include
investment "ratings," the holdings of endowment funds, investment
companies and the like. The evolution of evidentiary customs of
American courts in this respect needs research.
(4) "... manage their own affairs .. !
The emphasis here is upon avoidance of undue delegation as
well as upon doing "something" rather than "nothing." It is a dan-
gerous business for the untutored layman to leave everything to
an "active" trustee. Compare McMahon v. Krapf, 323 Mass. 118, 80
N. E. 2d 314 (1948). There seems to be a genuine appreciation of
the need for professional and expert assistance in the art of invest-
ment but the trustee himself must be alert and not leave everything
to someone else.
Thus the practicing physician of In re Sellers' Estate, 67 A. 2d
860 (Del. Ch. 1949), who finds himself trustee of a sizeable estate
consisting mainly of securities, has no excuse when he discovers
that he inadvertently failed to finish the dreary task of preparing
stock transfer papers, with a resultant loss when the sale did not
go through. Nor is he allowed the cost of having his accounts
checked over; that is his own job. On the other hand the physician
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may, under these circumstances, employ an investment counselor,
he may have tax returns prepared, and he may be allowed the ex-
pense of accounting and bookkeeping services.
The Minnesota court, In re Butler's Trusts, 223 Minn. 196, 26
N. W. 2d 204, 172 A.L.R. 977 (1947), had occasion to discuss the
employment of agents to perform trust duties. The case involved
payment for services to the trust-whether the cost is to be borne
by the estate or included in the trustee's compensation-but the
general question of authority to delegate duties was considered:
"In unusual and complicated cases, there may be both justification
and need for the employment of specialized skill in the preparation
of certain periodic accounts or in establishing a fundamental plan
of bookkeeping."
General slackness cannot be condoned. Informality of adminis-
tration-with mingling of individual and trust assets, failure to
keep records and accounts, and a consequent inability to provide
the beneficiary with adequate information about the trust-will not
be excused under the guise of constituting an exercise of discre-
tionary power. In re McCabe's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 503, 220 P.
2d 614 (1950).
For other typical cases involving laxness in performance of
the more mechanical trust duties, see McMahon v. Krapf, supra;
Rugo v. Rugo, 325 Mass. 612, 91 N. E. 2d 826 (1950); Akin v. War-
ner, 318 Mass. 669, 63 N. E. 2d 566 (1945); Riggs v. Loweree, 189
Md. 437, 56 A. 2. 152 (1947).
There is a distinction, of course, between inattention to duty
and a deliberate determination not to take action. See the much-
litigated New Jersey case of Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews,
142 N. J. Eq. 632, 61 A. 2d 297 (1948) (cash may be held uninvested
for a reasonable time in expectation of pending distribution), and
the same case at 6 N. J. Super. 196, 70 A. 2d 784 (1950) (periodic
consideration of whether to retain or dispose of testator's securi-
ties).
As might be expected, a court accustomed to prudent man
standards will tend to be sympathetic toward intentional inaction.
Ridgely v. Pflngstag, 188 Md. 209, 50 A. 2d 578 (1947), carries the
sympathy rather far, particularly in the casual way with which an
apparent mingling of trust and individual assets was disregarded.
As to the inaction, however,--a failure to invest cash received-the
court adopts a rather common sense attitude: "It is common knowl-
edge, illustrated in inventories of decedents' estates, that cash in
bank, bearing no interest, constitutes a formerly unheard of pro-
portion of the total net worth of many prudent individuals ....
In the absence of evidence on the subject, no question of negligence
is properly before us. We merely hold that failure to invest this
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$3,550 was not, as a matter of law, negligence which caused loss to
the heirs."
So also, in Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 59 A. 2d 212 (Del.
Ch. 1948), where the testator instructed that his estate should be
"invested in good securities," the court looked with approbation at
the retention of unproductive land for 20 years, such retention hav-
ing been made as a result of an independent judgment that the
property would continue to increase in value. One cannot but
wonder, however, what the attitude would have been if the trustee's
judgment had not been proved correct by the sale price.
The trustee is charged with the affirmative duty of disposing of
improper investments. See discussion in Dickerson v. Camden Trust
Co., 1 N. J. 459, 64 A. 2d 214 (1949), affirming 140 N. J. Eq. 34, 53 A.
2d 225 (1947). But the courts will not be hasty to conden the re-
tention of an investment which, viewed in retrospect, should ob-
viously have been sold, but which at the time was not nearly so
obvious in its demand for action. In re Trust under Will of Corn-
stock, 219 Minn. 325, 17 N. W. 2d 656 (1945).
(5) ": . . not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the per-
manent disposition of their funds . . !'
Definitions of "speculative" participations must vary with time
and place and circumstances. The concept of permanence of invest-
ment, as contrasted with transactions entered into for a quick turn-
over or profit, is, however, basic.
Conant v. Lansden, 409 Ill. 149, 98 N. E. 2d 773 (1951), is an in-
teresting example of a generous attempt by the court to sort out the
trustees' prudent, permanent investments from those made in a
frantic, speculative attempt to extricate the trust from financial
quicksand. The trustees held a majority interest in a small mercan-
tile company, and when the company required additional cash the
money was provided from the trust in exchange for unsecured
promissory demand notes. No surcharge was levied as a result of
loss ensuing from this attempt to preserve a major trust asset. The
trustees went too far, however, when they endorsed notes of the
mercantile company after it was in the actual process of being dis-
solved. Similarly, the trustees were not charged for loss on un-
secured loans at 7 per cent interest to a leading dry goods concern
at a time when "bank officers considered loans to it as good invest-
ments," but it was hardly felt to be prudent to make another such
loan after the borrower was in default on two outstanding notes.
Similarly, the fact situation in St. Germaine's Adm'r. v. Tuttle,
114 Vt. 263, 44 A. 2d 137 (1945), shows a trustee prompted consid-
erably more by hope than by realities. He bought preferred stock
of the Tuttle Publishing Company. "The Tuttle Company was a
heavy borrower at the banks, no dividends had been paid on its
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common stock for over two years and its business was on the de-
cline. The Tuttle Publishing Company started out without any sur-
plus and on the same day that it issued its stock it mortgaged all
its property for over $16,000, and soon began to lose money." The
trustee's name, incidentally, was Tuttle.
Compare also the confused and confusing transactions entered
into, in the midst of the 1929 crash, by the trustee of Riggs v.
Loweree, 189 Md. 437, 56 A. 2d 152 (1947). He purchased Anaconda,
sold it at a major loss, bought Standard Oil on margin, suffered a
further loss. Taken in conjunction with his other activities it can
hardly be denied that he was speculating rather than investing.
Hutchings v. Louisville Trust Co., 303 Ky. 147, 197 S. W. 2d 83(1946), and Humpa v. Hedstrom, 341 Ill. App. 605, 94 N. E. 2d 614
(1950), each concern restrictions on investment powers-by the
then statute and by the trust instrument-but in each case the in-
vestment would be of doubtful long-term validity if made in the
exercise of full discretion, and even if the element of self-dealing
were lacking.
Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S. W. 2d 377 (1945), is
another example of self-dealing combined with obvious speculation;
the trustees borrowed from the trust and made spectacular personal
profits, but the court felt that the profits had best be turned over to
the trust.
Investment in a trade or business is also forbidden as excess-
ively risky, although it is, of course, proper to carry on the testator's
enterprise when so directed by the will. Nelligan v. Long 320 Mass.
439, 70 N. E. 2d 175 (1946).
(6) "... considering the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be invested."
To state any clause of the Prudent Man Rule is to state, basic-
ally, the dual nature of the trustee's task-proper attention to the
rights of both the life tenant and the remainderman. The prudent
man is by nature moderate and balanced, looking to the future but
living in the present. Thus his duty of loyalty runs equally to both
sets of beneficiaries; his obligation to make the trust productive has
its counterpart in the requirement that he not bleed the trust for the
sole advantage of the income beneficiary.
Specifically, just as it is necessary that trust funds should pro-
duce income, McInnes v. Goldwaite, 94 N. H. 331, 52 A. 2d 795, 171
A.L.R. 1414 (1947), so too is it "settled that an unauthorized invest-
ment in wasting assets will not be sustained," Nelligan v. Long 320
Mass. 439, 70 N. E. 2d 175 (1946).
The Nelligan case makes the point, in a situation where author-
ity is given to retain a wasting asset, a traprock business, that a de-
preciation reserve may or may not be in order depending upon
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whether the authority is for a permanent retention of the asset, or
merely until a sale can be conveniently made. In the former situa-
tion, says the court, the inference is that the power to retain is given
for the benefit of the life tenant, especially since testamentary pro-
visions for the wife and children "are to be liberally construed."
The case is interesting in that it rules against amortization in the
jurisdiction where the evil inherent in a failure to amortize has
long been recognized.
The Missouri court describes as "the Massachusetts Rule" the
practice of amortizing bonds purchased at a premium. Mercantile-
Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Morse, 356 Mo. 336, 201 S. W. 2d
915 (1947). In this case the trustee was authorized to amortize, over
the protests of the testator's grand-daughter who was the current
life tenant, but the trustee was instructed that it should not, in the
reverse situation, accumulate discounts on bonds bought below par
and credit such discounts to income.
Much may apparently depend on who the income beneficiary
is. In Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S. W. 2d
404 (1949), for example, the court was obviously not too sympa-
thetic toward the plea of the income beneficiary who was already
receiving about $30,000 per year from the trust. Actually, this may
have been the major factor on which the decision rested; the case
concerned unproductive property which had been retained simply
because the successor trustee in office did not have a power of sale
under the trust instrument, and when the property was finally sold
by court authorization it was held that there should be no allocation
of the proceeds to income because the trustee did not have a duty
to sell. It may be questioned whether the prudent trustee might
not well feel that he has at least some duty to ask for a power of
sale when he finds the trust burdened with an unexpectedly un-
profitable investment.
For what is perhaps a more typical case of apportionment of
the proceeds of sale of unproductive property see Delaware Trust
Co. v. Bradford, 59 A. 2d 212 (Del. Ch. 1948).
Obviously the trustee cannot defend himself, when the prin-
cipal deteriorates, by pointing out that the income had equalled or
exceeded the current rate of return on usual trust investments. St.
Germaine's Admr. v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263, 44 A. 2d 137 (1945). A
rather more balanced attention to all interests would be that of the
trustee who was limited by the testator to deposits in savings banks,
but who nevertheless took it upon himself to ask for, and receive,
authorization to invest somewhat more fruitfully. Citizens' National
Bank v. Morgan, 94 N. H. 284, 51 A. 2d 841, 170 A.L.R. 1215 (1947).
Despite a growing appreciation of the income beneficiary's
needs it is nevertheless not to be supposed that cases and commen-
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tators will cease declaring that the trustee must lay primary stress
on the preservation of capital.
In the St. Germaine's case, supra, for example, with its invest-
ment in stock of a family corporation which was clearly heading
down-hill, the court automatically used the standard phraseology,
"considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of
the capital." In the very next sentence, however, the opinion ad-
jures the trustee that he "must always bear in mind th at the primary
object of the creation of the trust is the preservation and perpetuity
of the fund until the time for its distribution arrives; and he must
make no investment by which this object may be at all likely to be
defeated."
A more balanped approach may be expected when the court
itself is considering an investment program. In Security Trust Co.
v. Mahoney, 307 Ky. 661, 212 S. W. 2d 115 (1948), the testator had
placed his farms in trust, with directions that they not be sold.
When the real estate became unproductive, however, authorization
was given to sell, and the life tenant then sought to have the pro-
ceeds invested in a blue chip common stock list. She was successful
-at least to the extent of 75 per cent of the fund; (the court felt
that 25 per cent should be put in government bonds). While em-
phasis formerly lay on preservation of the trust, it now "seems to
be a well settled principle that a trustee, in administering an estate
for present beneficiaries of income and for remaindermen, is bound
as much to secure the usual rate of income upon sale investments
for the present benficiary of income as to preserve the corpus for
the benefit of the remaindermen .... In order then impartially to
discharge this dual duty, it is proper to invoke the aid of the pru-
dent man investment doctrine."
The so-called "deviation" cases, where permission is sought to
broaden the investment powers contained in the trust instrument,
often furnish an insight into the approach which a particular court
expects of its trustees. To some degree the court in these cases is
given the opportunity to say that it is as imprudent for a trustee
as for anyone else to be so occupied with preservation of principal
that he loses sight of the need for income.
In Connecticut, Second Eccesiastical Society v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 133 Conn. 89, 48 A. 2d 266 (1946), and Missouri, St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S. W. 2d 556 (1949),
liberal decisions expanded the scope of investments available to the
trustee. In Minnesota, however, the trustee was unsuccessful when
he sought authority, after passage of the Minnesota Prudent Man
Statute, to expand his granted powers so as to invest in stocks. The
court quoted the familiar line, "prime consideration is the necessity
for the preservation of the estate," and refused to allow deviation
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from the will merely to produce higher income or benefits to the
beneficiaries. In re Trust under Will of Jones, 221 Minn. 524, 22
N. W. 2d 633 (1946).
Charges of favoritism toward either life tenant or remainder-
man may, of course, arise in myriad ways. It may be urged that too
many trust expenses are being paid from income. Chicago Title and
Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399 Ill. 320, 77 N. E. 2d 675 (1948). Or
that not enough expenses are being charged to income. Merchants
Bank & Trust Co. v. New Canaan Historical Society, 133 Conn.
706, 54 A. 2d 696 (1947). Or that capital improvements are being
made in bad faith in order to deprive the beneficiary of his income.
Craven v. Craven, 407 Ill. 252, 95 N. E. 2d 489 (1950). Or that a
discretionary power to make principal payments is being abused.
Compare Smith v. Paquin, 325 Mass. 231, 90 N. E. 2d 1 (1950).
It is apparent, in short, that the trustee operating under the
Prudent Man Rule will find himself with many decisions to make;
he will certainly need sympathetic and sometimes generous courts
to protect him in those decisions. He assumes a heavy duty. Yet I
cannot but think that he must be comforted when he compares his
lot to that of his brother in Mississippi who succeeded to a trustee-
ship where only the named trustee had been granted discretionary
powers. The court, In re Hart's Estate, 206 Miss. 498, 40 So. 2d. 263
(1949), authorized the retention of stable common stocks, but just
to be sure that things didn't get completely out of hand it required
the trustee to report the values of the stocks to the court every six
months-so that decision might be handed down for guidance dur-
ing the succeeding half year!
